An anonymous former senior Kremlin official, writing in The Economist, says a subtle but telling shift is underway inside Russia’s power structure: officials, regional governors, and business figures are no longer speaking of Putin’s actions as “ours,” but as “his.” The author presents that linguistic change as a sign of growing distance between the president and the elite class. The article also estimates that over the past three years, the Russian state has seized about $60 billion in private assets, with some nationalized and some transferred to people close to Putin.
The former official argues that Putin launched the war to consolidate his rule and preserve the system he built, yet the conflict has produced a different result. For the first time, Russians are beginning to imagine a future without him. The piece does not describe the elite as newly committed to democracy or the rule of law. Its point is narrower, and sharp: even those loyal to the regime now want predictable rules for settling disputes. Wealthy Russians once had Western legal systems as a backstop for assets held abroad. That escape route, the author says, has been shut by exit restrictions and Western sanctions.
Inflation, borrowing costs, and weaker growth forecasts add pressure
The article ties that elite unease to deteriorating economic conditions. Russia’s central bank expects 2026 inflation at 5.0% to 5.5%, and the benchmark rate was pushed up to 21%. That has raised debt pressure on companies and borrowers, while warnings over defaults and financial stress have grown louder. Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak has cut the country’s 2026 GDP growth forecast from 1.3% to 0.4%. In the first two months of 2026, the budget deficit reached 5.99 trillion rubles.
The same report says Ukrainian military strikes have knocked out at least 40% of Russia’s refining capacity, dealing a structural blow to energy income. Moscow has also tightened control over capital movement. Putin ordered a ban, effective May 1, 2026, on exports of gold bars weighing more than 100 grams. Public sentiment appears to be shifting as well. According to data from a Russian state pollster cited in the piece, Putin’s approval rating has fallen from above 80% before the war to 65.6%. Another report cited there puts public trust in him at 29.5%.
Report says Putin spends most of his time managing the war
The article also points to Putin’s shrinking public profile. Citing Financial Times reporting based on unnamed sources, it says he now spends about 70% of his time in underground bunkers micro-managing the war, driven by fears of a coup or a Ukrainian drone assassination attempt. The remaining 30% is spent on other state matters, including the economy. In the former official’s telling, the regime has stopped selling a vision of national revival or modernization at home. What remains is repression, censorship, and control.
He writes that Russia’s old implicit bargain — stay out of politics and keep a private life — is breaking down. People are being asked to show loyalty, but, as he puts it, no one is being told what future that loyalty is meant to serve. Even so, the author warns against expecting an immediate rupture. The state still controls the machinery of fear and repression. A change in language is not the same as political action. His final point is that Putin’s system can keep functioning while he remains in office, yet each move made to preserve and expand his power is also accelerating the system’s decay.