Alex Thorn, Head of Research at Galaxy Digital, revealed after the Bitcoin Conference 2026 that developers and researchers in closed-door sessions formed a clear consensus: Satoshi Nakamoto's original coins must not be moved or altered on-chain.
Speaking from Las Vegas meetings with developers, advocates and researchers, Thorn noted that while quantum computing risks were discussed, an overwhelming majority opposed any action targeting Satoshi's early addresses. Altering those holdings would break Bitcoin's fundamental property rules, he stressed. "Satoshi's coins should not be touched," Thorn said, citing repeated discussions at the event.
22,000 Addresses Spread Risk
The early coins use Pay-to-Public-Key (P2PK) structures, historically raising security concerns under quantum attack scenarios. However, Thorn highlighted that Satoshi's holdings are distributed across roughly 22,000 separate addresses, each containing only about 50 BTC. This fragmentation means any large-scale breach would require cracking thousands of private keys individually, sharply reducing the probability of a coordinated "honeypot" collapse. Thorn argued this spatial distribution diminishes the viability of quantum-driven mass seizure.
Quantum Threat Considered Long-Term
Thorn further pointed out that active wallets—including exchange hot wallets—present bigger targets today. Those entities can migrate to post-quantum addresses when necessary. He referenced neutral atom quantum computing systems, which currently support only long-range attack models, placing practical quantum threats well in the future.
The discussion also touched on Bitcoin's capacity to absorb large movements. Citing data presented during remarks, Thorn said the market has smoothly absorbed sell-offs exceeding 1 million BTC between October 2025 and the present period without major disruption.
Post-Quantum Work Proceeds Cautiously
Developer teams continue exploring post-quantum cryptography, including signature compression, implementation optimization, and deployment strategy review. Thorn said participants broadly support preparing these tools for future use but oppose premature activation. He warned that early protocol changes could divert core developer attention and introduce untested risks. The ongoing research aims to balance long-term security needs against the perils of hasty upgrades—a pragmatic middle path endorsed by many in the room.