Shahaf Bar-Geffen, co-founder of blockchain technology firm COTI, said the long-running controversy around central bank digital currencies, or CBDCs, is likely to fade as major financial institutions become more comfortable with the technology and as more workable design models emerge. In his view, CBDCs should be understood less as a direct response to Bitcoin and more as an attempt by central banks and governments to modernize payment infrastructure, especially for fast, low-friction cross-border transactions.
Bar-Geffen made the comments while addressing the uneven global stance toward CBDCs. Some jurisdictions are actively testing or developing sovereign digital currencies, while others remain skeptical or openly hostile. The article notes that in the United States, the government had gone as far as issuing an executive order that effectively barred federal agencies from creating a CBDC. Even so, Bar-Geffen suggested that such divergence is not unusual at this stage, given the scale of the technological and institutional changes required.
Privacy as a Core Design Requirement
A central point in Bar-Geffen’s argument is that privacy must be treated as a foundational element of any CBDC rollout. He pointed to COTI’s previous work with the Bank of Israel in the Digital Shekel challenge, where the company’s role focused on integrating privacy technology to help protect users’ data. For him, privacy is not an optional feature or a public-relations layer added later, but a basic requirement if CBDCs are to gain legitimacy among users and avoid becoming synonymous with financial surveillance.
That position speaks to one of the most persistent criticisms of state-backed digital currencies. Supporters often emphasize efficiency, programmability, and broader access to digital payments, but critics worry that a poorly designed CBDC could give authorities unprecedented visibility into individuals’ financial behavior. Bar-Geffen’s comments suggest that projects hoping to move beyond pilots and into real-world use will need to address that tension directly. In practical terms, the success of CBDCs may depend not only on payment speed or settlement quality, but also on whether users believe their data is adequately shielded.
He framed CBDCs as a tool that could allow central banks to upgrade public-facing financial services in line with the expectations of a digital economy. The strongest use case he highlighted was cross-border payments, where existing systems are often expensive, slow, and fragmented. If designed effectively, a CBDC could help governments provide citizens with a more seamless way to send and receive value internationally without the frictions associated with legacy rails.
Slow Progress Does Not Mean Failure
Bar-Geffen also pushed back on the idea that a lack of rapid implementation should be interpreted as a sign of weakness. According to him, many CBDC efforts remain in the research-and-development phase because traditional financial institutions—especially banks—need time to absorb changes of this magnitude. Rebuilding or upgrading national payment systems is not comparable to launching a consumer app or a new token. It involves coordination across regulators, banks, payment providers, compliance systems, and in some cases, cross-border monetary frameworks.
Still, he pointed to signs that some major economies are moving closer to deployment. The article highlights that the European Central Bank has indicated that its testing phase is nearing completion and has signaled plans to launch a CBDC by the end of the year. If that timeline holds, it would mark a significant step in the transition from experimentation to implementation and could shape how other jurisdictions structure their own digital currency strategies.
The broader implication is that the CBDC debate is entering a more practical phase. Rather than asking only whether central banks should issue digital money, policymakers and technology providers are increasingly being forced to answer harder operational questions: what privacy model should be used, how should access be controlled, what role commercial banks will play, and how interoperability should be handled both domestically and internationally.
Why Bitcoin May Not Be the Main Target
One of the most notable parts of Bar-Geffen’s argument is his rejection of the idea that CBDCs are being built primarily to defeat decentralized cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. He drew a distinction between the architecture and purpose of sovereign digital currencies and crypto assets like BTC. Bitcoin’s fixed supply and high degree of decentralization, he suggested, place it in a different category altogether from state-issued digital money.
For that reason, he does not see CBDCs as natural competitors to Bitcoin in the strictest sense. Bitcoin’s value proposition is rooted in scarcity, censorship resistance, and a monetary system outside direct state control. CBDCs, by contrast, are digital extensions of sovereign fiat systems. They may improve payment efficiency or policy transmission, but they do not reproduce the attributes that make Bitcoin distinct for many of its users and supporters.
This distinction matters because a large part of the public conversation around CBDCs has been framed as a battle between governments and crypto. Bar-Geffen’s comments complicate that narrative. In his reading, the conflict is less likely to play out between central bank money and decentralized bearer assets, and more likely to unfold in the realm of digital payments and fiat-linked settlement tools.
Stablecoins Could Face Stronger Pressure
Where Bar-Geffen does see direct competitive pressure is in the stablecoin market. Stablecoins already serve as a bridge between traditional fiat systems and crypto-native activity, offering price stability relative to sovereign currencies while remaining usable in digital-asset markets. Because CBDCs would also represent fiat-denominated value in digital form, they could end up competing more directly with stablecoins than with Bitcoin.
That does not mean he expects CBDCs to replace stablecoins across all use cases. In fact, he downplayed the likelihood that CBDCs will be designed to interface deeply with decentralized finance protocols or broader Web3 ecosystems. If central banks choose tightly controlled architectures with permissioned access and limited composability, then stablecoins may continue to dominate as the practical connector between the traditional financial system and blockchain-based applications.
In that scenario, stablecoins would retain a strategic role even if CBDCs become widespread. They could remain the preferred medium for moving value across exchanges, DeFi platforms, tokenized assets, and other onchain applications where flexibility and interoperability matter. CBDCs, meanwhile, might find stronger traction in retail payments, regulated transfers, and government-linked financial services.
Bar-Geffen’s position therefore suggests a segmented future rather than a winner-takes-all outcome. Bitcoin would remain distinct as a decentralized monetary asset, stablecoins would continue to serve crypto-native liquidity and onchain interoperability, and CBDCs would occupy a regulated sovereign layer focused on public payment infrastructure.
Adoption Outlook and Regional Strategy
Beyond the direct CBDC discussion, Bar-Geffen also referenced COTI’s role in the recently launched Africa Tokenization Council. According to him, the initiative is meant to accelerate blockchain adoption in Africa and the Middle East by bringing together regional authorities and global blockchain experts. The objective is to make decision-making more efficient, improve access to funding, and speed up the implementation of real-world blockchain solutions.
That regional emphasis is notable because many of the most compelling arguments for digital payment modernization—including cross-border remittances, financial access, and infrastructure leapfrogging—are especially relevant in emerging markets. While the article does not provide additional metrics or case studies, Bar-Geffen’s comments indicate that COTI sees public-private coordination as a necessary part of scaling blockchain-based systems beyond pilot programs.
Looking ahead, he said CBDCs are likely to become widely used in at least some parts of the world within five years. At the same time, he cautioned that the eventual balance of benefits and risks will depend heavily on the groundwork being done today by technology providers, central banks, and institutional partners. In other words, the future of CBDCs will not be determined by issuance alone, but by design quality—especially in privacy, usability, and system integration.
His remarks ultimately portray CBDCs not as a simple replacement for crypto, nor as an inevitable threat to Bitcoin, but as a new layer in the digital money stack whose impact will vary by region and use case. If his assessment is correct, the next phase of the debate will focus less on ideology and more on implementation: who builds these systems, what standards they adopt, and whether they can deliver efficiency without sacrificing user trust.