ChainFeeds PRO reviews Ethereum post-quantum proofs, account migration and stealth address privacy

ChainFeeds PRO reviews Ethereum post-quantum proofs, account migration and stealth address privacy

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News Editor
2026-10-12 15:49:56
ChainFeeds Research’s latest PRO issue pulls together a wide set of protocol and research updates across Ethereum and Bitcoin, with a strong focus on post-quantum design. The report highlights Ethereum researcher soispoke’s discussion of how applications should identify provable programs if Ethereum eventually supports native STARK-style post-quantum proofs. Rather than tying contracts to a specific proving system through a verification key hash, the proposal favors a more stable Program ID that can survive future prover and cryptography changes, with ISA versioning built directly into the identifier. The Ethereum section also covers ERC-8403, presented by Nethermind developer AnkushinDaniil, which stores a single 32-byte Merkle root instead of all account keys directly. That structure is framed as a path for gradual migration from secp256k1 keys to post-quantum keys without changing account addresses. Another featured item examines how Ethereum’s stealth address protocol could gain post-quantum privacy by replacing ECDH with ML-KEM, preserving unlinkability of historical stealth payments even if elliptic-curve cryptography is broken in the future. On the Bitcoin side, the issue revisits address reuse as a basic privacy failure, notes discussion around BIP324 dynamic message IDs and tagged hash naming, and summarizes Shielded Bitcoin plus security fixes in Core Lightning and LDK. It also rounds up recent MEV research and a paper arguing that DeFi vaults have evolved from yield aggregators into curator-driven on-chain asset management systems.

Lead focus: what ISA should Ethereum use for post-quantum proofs?

ChainFeeds Research used PRO issue #161, published on Oct. 12, 2026, to survey recent work across Bitcoin protocol development, Ethereum governance and research, and new academic papers. The lead item centered on Ethereum researcher soispoke and a design question that becomes important if Ethereum ever adds native support for STARK-style post-quantum proofs: what instruction set architecture should applications target when they write programs that later need to be proven?

As summarized in the report, EIP-8288 currently leans toward identifying a proving program through a Verification Key Hash. The problem is durability. If the proving system changes later, the verification key may change as well, and contracts that have already been deployed and cannot be upgraded could stop working. soispoke’s alternative is to bind applications to a more stable Program ID instead of a specific proving system. Under that model, a proof only needs to show that a given program executed correctly on a given input, while the underlying prover and proving system can change over time.

That leads to the harder question: what ISA should that program run on? soispoke compares three options: the EVM, RISC-V, and a proof-oriented Ethereum ISA, or eISA. The EVM has one obvious advantage: Ethereum has maintained it for years. But its 256-bit architecture was not built for zkVMs, proof generation is less efficient, and many cryptographic operations still depend on precompiles. RISC-V comes with a more mature compiler stack, cryptographic libraries, and a broader zkVM ecosystem, which improves proving efficiency. The tradeoff is long-term protocol burden. If Ethereum lets smart contracts depend permanently on RISC-V semantics, the protocol would also need to preserve those semantics over the long run. eISA could be designed in a minimal way around proving efficiency, but the ecosystem, tooling, and formal verification base are still immature.

soispoke’s proposed answer is to include the ISA version directly in the Program ID, for example through hash(ISA version, program bytes). Old programs would always execute under the ISA rules in place when they were created, while future hard forks could add new ISA versions and new features. In that setup, applications already deployed would remain usable even if the proving system, prover, or cryptographic assumptions changed later.

Bitcoin protocol updates: address reuse, BIP324 and Shielded Bitcoin

Address reuse remains a basic privacy failure

The Bitcoin section opens with a simple privacy issue that users still miss: address reuse. Bitcoin is not an anonymous system, the report notes, but a pseudonymous one, and every transaction is recorded publicly on-chain. When the same address receives funds multiple times, outside observers can connect those payments and analyze balances, counterparties, and fund flows.

Modern HD wallets can derive nearly unlimited addresses from a single seed, so the normal practice is to use a fresh address for every payment. Reuse usually comes from manual behavior: publishing the same donation address for a long period, sending the same address to multiple payers, or copying an address from an old transaction and using it again. Avoiding reuse does not make Bitcoin fully anonymous, but it does reduce the chance that separate payments can be linked directly, making it one of the lowest-cost privacy habits available to users.

This part of the issue cites Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #426.

BIP324 dynamic message IDs

Anthony Towns proposed allowing each peer to assign its own 1-byte message ID when a v2 P2P connection is established. Under the current BIP324 design, message IDs come from a fixed table. New messages need global coordination to get a short ID; otherwise they must use the full 12-byte name. The proposed change would make experimental P2P messages easier to deploy and would also reduce some communication overhead.

Tagged hash naming rules

The community is also discussing whether BIP340-style tagged hashes should include the BIP number in the tag. Adding the number would guarantee uniqueness, but if a draft later receives an official number and the tag changes, existing implementations and test vectors would break. The tradeoff is between uniqueness and specification stability.

Shielded Bitcoin

Misha Komarov and others proposed a privacy-transfer meta-protocol that does not require changes to Bitcoin consensus. In the design, funds exist as encrypted notes similar to UTXOs. Transfers publish a new note, a nullifier, and a validity proof, hiding both the transfer amount and the two parties involved.

Security fixes in Core Lightning and LDK

Core Lightning 26.06.9 fixes multiple security issues involving channel reestablishment, splicing, HTLC handling, and access control. LDK also fixed a vulnerability that could have allowed a malicious channel peer to steal forwarded HTLC funds.

Ethereum research: ERC-8403 and post-quantum account migration

ERC-8403 stores one hash instead of every key

In the Ethereum section, Nethermind developer AnkushinDaniil introduces ERC-8403, a proposal that gives account abstraction a unified way to manage authority. Instead of storing all keys directly, an account would store only a 32-byte Merkle root. Signing keys, spending limits, unlock times, and other authority data would be encoded as leaves in a Merkle tree.

When a user sends a transaction, the account only needs proof that the authority being used belongs to that root, along with the corresponding signature. Adding, removing, or rotating keys all reduce to the same operation: updating the root while keeping the account address unchanged.

The report frames this as a useful structure for future post-quantum migration. EIP-8288 could verify larger post-quantum signatures outside the EVM and aggregate them through block-level STARKs, while ERC-8403 would define which post-quantum keys the account is currently allowed to use. From the account’s perspective, secp256k1 keys and post-quantum keys are simply different types of authority leaves. That means users could add post-quantum keys gradually and revoke old keys without creating a new address or migrating the whole account.

ERC-8403 also supports cross-chain authority management. Authority data could live on a designated home chain, while other chains read the corresponding root through storage proofs so that a multi-chain account shares one authority set. AnkushinDaniil also suggests putting both checks — whether a key belongs to the account and whether the signature is valid — into a STARK, leaving only a hash on-chain.

There are still practical limits. A single proof is currently about 162 to 235 KiB, and LeanVM has not yet implemented full zero-knowledge functionality. For now, the report treats the idea as a longer-term direction rather than something close to deployment.

A minimal compute-anchored purchasing power signal

Community member j0i0m0b0o proposed an on-chain purchasing power signal that does not depend on exchange prices, stablecoins, or traditional oracles. The mechanism tries to create open competition between ETH and real-world compute cost.

In the design, a requester posts a reward, a reporter submits a computation-difficulty threshold and locks ETH, and other participants can try to find a nonce that breaks the reporter’s claim. If someone succeeds, the breaker receives part of the funds. If nobody succeeds, the reporter eventually gets the reward.

The economic pressure is the point. If the threshold is too low, it will be broken easily and the reporter loses money. If it is too high, the reporter’s own reward efficiency falls. Over time, the system could reveal how much computation is required to protect a given amount of ETH, producing a signal for ETH’s purchasing power relative to compute resources.

The report says the approach has two clear strengths: it is fully on-chain and based on actual compute competition, and the prototype contract is very small at roughly 200 lines of code. But it also has obvious limits. Hardware efficiency, electricity prices, ASIC adoption, and regional differences all affect compute cost, so the mechanism cannot stand in for overall real-world purchasing power. It is better described as a long-term reference indicator for ETH relative to compute resources, not a conventional price oracle.

Post-quantum privacy for stealth addresses

Another featured item comes from community member namnc, who looks at how Ethereum’s stealth address protocol could gain post-quantum privacy. Existing stealth address systems usually rely on elliptic-curve ECDH. A receiver publishes a meta-address, a sender uses an ephemeral key to establish a shared secret with the receiver, and that secret is then used to derive a one-time receiving address.

The weakness appears in a future where quantum computers can break elliptic-curve cryptography. If that happens, public keys, announcements, and historical payments collected today could be reanalyzed later, allowing previously unlinkable stealth payments to be connected.

namnc proposes replacing traditional ECDH with ML-KEM. The sender would use the receiver’s ML-KEM public key to derive the shared secret and then derive the stealth address from that secret. Even if secp256k1 is broken by a quantum attack in the future, historical stealth payments would remain unlinkable as long as ML-KEM itself stays secure, because the attacker still could not reconstruct the secret that links the announcement to the payment.

The report adds one important caveat: full post-quantum security would still require spending authorization to move from ECDSA to a post-quantum signature scheme.

The design also has another benefit. The chain that carries the announcement and the chain that carries the payment can be separated further. Ethereum could be used only to publish the ML-KEM announcement, while the actual stealth payment takes place on another chain.

MEV research roundup: protected order flow, Flashblocks and encrypted mempools

The issue also pulls highlights from Flashbots’ research-focused newsletter, The MEV Letter #156.

  • Does your MEV protection work? Not always. reports that sandwich attacks continue to appear across multiple chains even when transactions are sent through private RPCs, order flow auctions, or chain-level protection systems. The takeaway is narrow but clear: protected order flow does not fully stop leakage or front-running.
  • Priority Gas Auction Cadence and Searcher Competition studies how Base’s 200 ms Flashblocks changed searcher competition. After Flashblocks went live, effective priority fees paid by searchers fell noticeably, but the shorter auction window also made low latency more important in some arbitrage opportunities.
  • Active Liquidity On Chain compares PropAMM with traditional AMMs. Because PropAMM can update quotes actively and adjust fees based on order-flow risk, it is described as less exposed to being picked off on stale prices than AMMs that wait for arbitrageurs to correct pricing.
  • On the Geographic Incentives of Multiple Concurrent Proposers examines whether multiple concurrent proposers would improve validator geographic decentralization. The study says the answer depends on role design. If proposers also act as attesters, they have stronger incentives to stay close to other validators. If the two roles are separated, geographic dispersion becomes more likely.
  • Accountability for Encrypted Mempools, by Aditi Partap and Arantxa Zapico, proposes accountability tools for decryption committees in encrypted mempools. If a member leaks or sells a decryption share early, traitor tracing could be used to identify the source.
  • The video Staking Nerd Talk covers the retirement of Type 0 transactions, Glamsterdam, post-quantum security, and possible Hegotá upgrades including frame transactions.
  • The video ACDC #188 discusses Glamsterdam readiness on Sepolia and the scope of Hegotá, with Quick Slots now formally moved to CFI.

Paper watch: DeFi vaults are becoming on-chain asset management systems

The paper section highlights A Systematization of Knowledge on DeFi Vaults: Architectures, Curation Mechanisms, and Strategy Design.

The authors are from the University of Milano-Bicocca and the University of Luxembourg. Their paper organizes the design space of DeFi vaults, curator models, and strategy construction. It classifies vaults by asset exposure, governance, and strategy execution, and reviews risks tied to smart contracts, liquidity, oracles, curators, keepers, and cross-chain setups.

The central argument is that modern vaults have moved beyond simple automated yield aggregators. They now look more like curator-driven on-chain asset management systems, where strategy choices and risk parameters are set by human or organizational operators. As a result, risk increasingly comes from management and operations, not only from code.

This article was originally published by Bit.Fan. For more cryptocurrency news and market insights, visit www.bit.fan.
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ChainFeeds PRO reviews Ethereum post-quantum proofs, account migration and stealth address privacy | Bit.Fan