On Sept. 20, Li Lecheng was still at China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.
That day, he chaired a roundtable for small and medium-sized enterprises. The eight companies on the other side of the table came from artificial intelligence, commercial space and quantum technology, among other fields.
The discussion was not about traditional investment promotion. The ministry said support for high-quality companies should shift from a passive model of waiting for applications to a more proactive approach: identify firms earlier, especially those focused on technology and products, and address their problems in application scenarios, financing and industrial-chain coordination before those issues pile up.
Three days later, on Sept. 23, Li left the ministry and became Party secretary of Anhui province.
According to information released by Xinhua, the adjustment was made by the central authorities based on work needs and the actual requirements of Anhui’s leadership team. Li previously served as director of the Hubei Development and Reform Commission, Party secretary of Xiangyang, executive vice governor of Hubei, governor of Liaoning, and then minister of industry and information technology in April 2025.
Viewed on its own, this was a personnel change. Put next to Anhui’s development in recent years, it also reveals a clear overlap: a person who was still looking for the next wave of industrial companies in Beijing three days earlier has now gone to a province that is looking for its next wave of industry.
Anhui’s best-known stories used to be its bets on BOE, ChangXin and NIO. By 2026, though, describing the province simply as a local government that knows how to invest is no longer enough. Projects once seen as high-stakes bets have started feeding back into the local economy, and Anhui is still searching for new sources of growth.
In 2025, Anhui ranked first in China for both total automobile output and new energy vehicle output for the first time, while complete vehicle exports topped 1 million units for the first time.
On another front, ChangXin Technology, based in Hefei, listed on Shanghai’s STAR Market in July. On its first trading day, its total market value reached 3.28 trillion yuan, making it the largest A-share company by market capitalization. On Aug. 17, its market value hit 4.13 trillion yuan, making it the first listed A-share company to cross 4 trillion yuan.
Ten years earlier, ChangXin was still a DRAM project that Hefei had to support with substantial capital.
Ten years later, backed by the ChangXin Memory supply chain, Hefei’s integrated circuit industry output had risen from about 18 billion yuan in 2016 to 151.4 billion yuan in 2025. By early 2026, the city had more than 600 integrated circuit companies above designated size and more than 70,000 employees in the sector.
Anhui is no longer holding just a few corporate names. It now has a group of industries.
At the same time, another set of sectors has already been placed on the table even though many of them still do not have clear leading companies: quantum technology, fusion, brain-computer interfaces, embodied intelligence, biomanufacturing and aerospace information.
Anhui has already started building pilot zones for these areas, looking for application scenarios, setting up pilot-scale testing capacity and arranging funds.
The timing is notable. Three days before Li left the ministry, the companies sitting in front of him were from AI, commercial space and quantum technology.
A province moving from finding companies to guiding industries has now received an official with deep industrial experience.
Anhui no longer lacks a strong company
Any discussion of Anhui’s industrial base has to start with autos.
In the first half of 2026, Anhui produced 1.6867 million vehicles, including 881,800 new energy vehicles. It exported 1.006 million vehicles, with export value reaching 104.36 billion yuan. All four indicators ranked first nationwide.
Hefei has already gathered JAC, BYD, NIO, Volkswagen, Changan and Ankai. Wuhu has built another automotive supply chain around Chery. In Wuhu alone, the number of industrial-chain companies above designated size in the auto sector reached 1,245 in the first half of 2026, including 926 parts makers.
Still, the case that better shows why Anhui’s model can work is ChangXin.
When Hefei decided in 2016 to launch a DRAM project, this was not a light-asset business.
The first phase of ChangXin involved total investment of 18 billion yuan, with Hefei Industrial Investment contributing 14.4 billion yuan, or 80%. After that, state-owned capital from Anhui province and Hefei city continued to participate in multiple financing rounds. The planned total investment for the 12-inch memory wafer manufacturing base reached 150 billion yuan.
This went far beyond ordinary investment attraction. A city put up more than 10 billion yuan and stayed with one company through a decade of heavy spending, while betting on a DRAM market then dominated by Samsung, SK Hynix and Micron.
By 2026, the return had arrived.
On July 27, ChangXin Technology went public. Its closing market value on the first day reached 3.28 trillion yuan, immediately putting it at the top of the A-share market. Based on the first-day share price and a broad measure of holdings by Hefei state-owned capital platforms, the book value of those shares exceeded 1 trillion yuan. The book value corresponding to Anhui Investment Group’s holdings also exceeded 200 billion yuan.
Two months later, the market was still assigning it a valuation of 4 trillion yuan.
For Anhui, though, market value is not the whole story. Hefei’s integrated circuit industry output was about 18 billion yuan in 2016. By 2025, it had reached 151.4 billion yuan.
After ChangXin landed in Hefei, the city kept filling in the chain across wafer manufacturing, chip design, equipment and materials. By early 2026, it had more than 600 integrated circuit companies above designated size and more than 70,000 employees.
One government investment did not just produce a stock. It pulled in more design, manufacturing, materials and equipment companies around the city.
This is also where the so-called Hefei model is often misunderstood. Outsiders like to say it won a bet. What Anhui gained later was not just investment income from a few projects, but a gradually complete industrial system.
The auto industry validated that model even earlier.
In the past, local government helped NIO find funding and factories. Now the automotive sector can supply motors, electric control systems, sensors, supply chains and manufacturing capacity to robotics.
In 2025, the value added of Anhui’s electronic information manufacturing industry above designated size rose 40.9%, accounting for 12.6% of the province’s industrial value added and contributing 42.2% of industrial growth.
In 2025, AI companies above designated size in Anhui generated 246.55 billion yuan in revenue, and the province ranked fifth nationwide in industrial development evaluation. In the first half of 2026, Anhui produced 2,665 humanoid robots, and companies across the full robotics chain exceeded 660.
Over the past decade and more, Anhui was solving a single problem: find one company that could change a city, then figure out how to bring it in.
That problem is less scarce today. Chery, ChangXin, BOE, NIO and iFlytek are already on the table.
The harder step now is to judge which technologies will become industries before a clear leader appears.
Building roads for industries that still lack leaders
Anhui has already written that task into policy.
The province’s 2024 Action Plan for the Development of Future Industries proposed a “7+N” cultivation program covering quantum technology, aerospace information, general intelligence and low-carbon energy, among other directions.
One line in the document marks a break from older investment-promotion logic: connect the path segment by segment, from source innovation to technology transfer, product development, application scenarios, industrialization and industrial clusters.
Anhui is not just setting up a fund for future industries. It is trying to do four things at once.
First, define physical space
Anhui has started building future industry science parks and provincial pilot zones for future industries. If a city enters the preparatory list for a provincial pilot zone, the provincial finance department can award up to 10 million yuan based on task completion. If it later succeeds in creating a national-level pilot zone, it receives another 10 million yuan.
The sums are not huge. The point is to gather technologies such as quantum, fusion, brain-computer interfaces and embodied intelligence from scattered labs and startup teams into a more concentrated industrial space.
Second, change how state capital is assessed
Anhui specifically revised the assessment rules for state-owned venture capital in its future-industry policy. Funds are no longer judged by whether a single project makes money, and profit or return on assets is no longer treated as the key metric. Instead, funds can be assessed on overall operating results, with greater weight given to the effectiveness of future-industry projects.
At the same time, Anhui is integrating existing capital from provincial emerging-industry guidance funds to create funds aimed at future industries, while allowing government funds, local governments and companies to set up sub-funds together.
In plain terms, that allows state capital to wait longer and to invest in projects that may not show profits in the short term. That matters for future industries.
ChangXin once needed 18 billion yuan for its first phase. Quantum, brain-computer interfaces and fusion face their problems even earlier. Many teams do not even have factories yet; they have papers, patents and prototypes. Without changing the assessment rules for state-owned venture capital, these companies would have had a hard time making it onto Anhui’s investment list.
Third, help them find a first customer
Anhui has proposed building about 100 benchmark application scenarios and commercial solutions for future industries by 2030, along with about 100 provincial future-scenario laboratories and about 30 provincial future-scenario testing zones.
The province even wrote “government first procurement and first ordering” directly into policy. It supports governments in sharing R&D risk with companies through cooperative innovation procurement and buying innovative products according to R&D contracts. Qualified benchmark application scenarios can receive rewards of up to 1 million yuan per project.
Quantum can first enter communications and power systems. Brain-computer interfaces can first enter hospitals and rehabilitation. Robots can first enter auto factories and 4S dealerships. AI can move directly into autos, cement and equipment manufacturing. For these sectors, the first government, hospital, state-owned enterprise or factory customer can matter more than a financing round.
Fourth, fill the gap between labs and factories
Anhui’s policy repeatedly mentions concept verification, pilot-scale testing, science parks and application scenarios. For concept verification centers and pilot-scale validation platforms built in pilot zones, the province offers subsidies equal to 20% of fixed-asset investment, with a ceiling of 5 million yuan per platform.
The reason is straightforward. A paper does not directly generate revenue. Between a technology result and income lie prototypes, small-batch trial production, reliability testing, certification, procurement and mass production. Anhui used to be better at stepping in after a company had already proved its business model. Now it is pushing government resources further forward.
But Anhui is not alone in this race.
Shanghai has already set up a 10 billion yuan future industry fund, fully financed by the municipal budget, with a term that can be extended to as long as 18 years. It explicitly targets projects in brain-computer interfaces, controllable fusion, quantum computing and synthetic biology. Shanghai has also issued dedicated plans for brain-computer interfaces and other sectors, while building future-industry clusters.
In embodied intelligence, Shanghai’s Xuhui district offers support of up to 20 million yuan for key projects, and rewards of up to 500,000 yuan per unit for innovative products used for the first time.
Jiangsu has taken a different route. Backed by the manufacturing and university systems of Suzhou, Nanjing and Wuxi, it added quantum technology, brain-computer interfaces, embodied intelligence, biomanufacturing and 6G to its provincial frontier technology R&D plan in 2026.
That year, the province also provided about 30 frontier-technology application scenarios specifically for concept verification, pilot-scale testing and small-batch trial production. Brain-computer interfaces even received a standalone industrial action plan, with a goal of forming two to three leading companies with domestic and international influence by 2030.
Beijing Economic-Technological Development Area is also making moves. It has included embodied intelligence, commercial space, 6G, quantum, brain-computer interfaces, biomanufacturing and fusion energy in its future-industry layout.
So Anhui is not facing an uncontested blue ocean. Several provinces and cities with stronger industrial foundations are all betting on the same group of still-immature sectors. The lists look similar: quantum, fusion, brain-computer interfaces, robotics, 6G and biomanufacturing.
That also means many of Anhui’s tools are not unique.
Shanghai has a 10 billion yuan future-industry fund. Jiangsu is opening pilot-scale testing and application scenarios. Beijing is concentrating research resources and industrial parks on the same set of directions. Funds, parks, subsidies and scenarios have become standard equipment in the competition for future industries.
What Anhui needs to win is something beyond that standard package: whether those resources can actually turn into companies and orders.
Quantum communication needs buyers. Brain-computer interfaces need hospitals willing to test them. Robots need factories to open production lines. Fusion-related superconducting, vacuum and key equipment needs companies ready to take on the supply chain. If any one link fails, the technology may stay in the lab. If several links connect at once, suppliers, production lines and industrial clusters can start to form.
The next round of local-government competition is no longer mainly about whose policy is more generous. It is about whose industrialization moves faster.
For the same technology, the place that completes pilot-scale testing earlier, secures the first batch of orders earlier and reaches mass production earlier gives startup teams more reason to stay. Suppliers then gather around those orders. For sectors such as quantum, brain-computer interfaces and embodied intelligence, the earliest batches of orders and capacity may determine where the first generation of companies ultimately takes root.
This also exposes Anhui’s weakness. Research results, government funds and application scenarios do not automatically add up to an industry. The hardest stretch still lies in the middle: turning technology into products that can be delivered in volume, reliably and at low cost.
Roads at both ends, but no bridge in the middle
Anhui stands at both ends of that path.
On one side are the University of Science and Technology of China, the Hefei Comprehensive National Science Center, and research resources in fields such as quantum and fusion. On the other side are manufacturing sectors including autos, chips, displays, photovoltaics and robotics.
What is missing in between is industrialization.
A prototype built in a lab only proves that a technology can be made. Pilot-scale testing shows whether it can be produced consistently. Customer testing reveals problems in cost, yield and reliability. Only after sustained orders arrive do equipment, materials and component suppliers have a reason to expand capacity.
That is why the real question for whether quantum, brain-computer interfaces and robotics can stay in Anhui is not how many labs the province has. It is whether this chain can run through.
Anhui has already started patching these interfaces.
A national AI pilot-scale testing base has already landed in the province. Quantum technology has entered a 220-kilovolt substation in Hefei, where 18 categories and 85 sets of quantum technology results have begun operating on a real power grid. Anhui’s brain-computer interface industry plan also explicitly calls for hospitals including the First Affiliated Hospital of USTC and the First Affiliated Hospital of Anhui Medical University to carry out clinical research and trials for brain-computer interface products.
Fusion is not waiting only for a device to be completed. Anhui has already included large superconducting magnets, ultra-high-vacuum chambers, divertors and helium refrigerators in its industrial layout, aiming to form industries first around fusion-related equipment and materials.
Anhui’s existing manufacturing base also provides a ready entry point.
Mojia Robotics, incubated by Chery, has entered more than 60 countries and regions, with cumulative deliveries exceeding 2,000 units. Motors, electric control systems, sensors, production lines and supply chains built up in autos can move directly into robotics.
AI is also entering industrial systems. The AI large model for the cement and building materials industry jointly released by Conch Group and Huawei, among others, has already been used in quality control, production optimization, equipment management and workplace safety.
This is where Li Lecheng’s arrival intersects with Anhui’s industrial stage.
At the meeting he chaired three days before leaving the ministry, he proposed changing the way companies are discovered from waiting for applications to proactively going out to find them.
That proactive approach does not mean waiting until companies are large and then trying to attract them. It means finding them before industrialization is complete and solving the blocking issues along the way.
Some companies already have prototypes but cannot find a pilot line for small-batch trial production. Some products have completed testing but still cannot find the first hospital, state-owned enterprise or factory willing to buy them. Others have secured orders but cannot expand capacity because equipment, materials and component suppliers have not kept up.
From prototype to pilot-scale testing, from pilot-scale testing to the first order, and from the first order to mass production, each step brings a different set of problems. The value of early government involvement lies in connecting those broken points so companies can keep moving to the next stage.
At that point, the issue is no longer just investment. It becomes a matter of industrial organization.
Funds provide capital. Universities and labs provide technology. Hospitals, state-owned enterprises and factories provide scenarios. Manufacturers provide production lines and supply chains. The local government’s job is to reduce the number of times a technology gets stuck between those links.
Over the past several years, Li’s work on company cultivation, technological upgrading, specialized and sophisticated enterprises, industrial-chain coordination and opening application scenarios has fallen directly within those links.
That does not mean the personnel adjustment carried any industrial arrangement beyond what has been officially disclosed. The official wording remains that the move was made based on work needs and the actual requirements of Anhui’s leadership team.
But from the perspective of Anhui’s own industrial stage, the task is already there. ChangXin started as a DRAM factory. Around it, and through the expansion of Hefei’s broader integrated circuit industry, the city had more than 600 integrated circuit companies above designated size by early 2026.
New energy vehicles also grew from a handful of automakers into two industrial clusters in Hefei and Wuhu.
Whether quantum, fusion, brain-computer interfaces and embodied intelligence can repeat that process will not be decided by how many targets Anhui writes into policy. It will be decided by whether, a few years from now, those sectors also have a group of companies surviving on real orders behind them.
A leading company can be hit through capital. An industrial chain can only grow through companies, orders and production lines, one by one.
So when an official who has spent years working with industry inside the MIIT system arrives in Anhui, the significance of the move extends beyond personnel alone. It looks more like a match between capability and industrial need.
Over the past several years, Anhui has been becoming a place that understands industry more deeply. The province now also needs someone who understands industry more deeply.
This article was originally published by the WeChat public account Ziben Bu Aoye, written by Bu Aoye Research Institute.