A new report from The New York Times lays out how President Donald Trump approved “Operation Epic Fury” against Iran after weeks of internal arguments inside the White House. According to the report, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pushed hard for a joint strike plan, while U.S. intelligence officials, military leaders, and Vice President JD Vance warned about the assumptions and the risks. Trump went ahead anyway.
Netanyahu pitched an ambitious joint strike plan
The report says the turning point came during a classified Situation Room meeting on February 11. Netanyahu, accompanied by the head of Mossad intelligence, presented Trump with a sweeping proposal: destroy Iran’s missile program, cripple its ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, trigger internal unrest through Mossad operations, support a ground offensive by Iraqi Kurds, and ultimately remove Iran’s ruling system in favor of a secular leadership. Trump reportedly reacted positively and said the plan “sounds good.”
That optimism did not survive the next day’s U.S. review. CIA Director John Ratcliffe said American forces might be able to achieve decapitation strikes and degrade Iranian military capability, but the expectation of an internal uprising and regime change was detached from reality. He described that part of the scenario as “farcical.” Secretary of State Marco Rubio also dismissed it bluntly. The report says Trump was less concerned about what came after, so long as Iran’s military strength could be broken.
Vance emerged as the strongest internal critic
The article describes a White House team split over the costs of war. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine warned that a large-scale strike would drain U.S. weapons stockpiles and that replacing them would not be easy. He also flagged the danger of Iran moving to block the Strait of Hormuz. Trump, by contrast, believed U.S. military superiority would keep the conflict short.
Vice President JD Vance is portrayed as the most forceful opponent of a full war. He worried that the campaign would consume major resources, destabilize the region, drive oil prices higher, and undercut Trump’s long-running promise not to start new wars. Once it became clear that Trump had made up his mind, Vance shifted to arguing for a narrower operation rather than trying to stop it outright.
Other senior officials lined up differently. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth strongly backed military action. Rubio favored maximum pressure but did not mount a full effort to block the plan. Chief of Staff Susie Wiles had concerns about domestic politics and oil prices, yet left the final call to Trump and military advisers.
A perceived decapitation chance helped seal the decision
The report says Israeli lobbying was only one part of the story. Trump had long viewed Iran as a major threat and remained angry over what the article described as an Iranian plot to assassinate him. His confidence was also boosted by a recent U.S. operation in which Venezuelan leadership figures were captured without bloodshed. On top of that, U.S. and Israeli officials believed they had intelligence showing Iran’s supreme leader would appear at a ground gathering, creating what they saw as a potential decapitation opportunity. The collapse of diplomatic talks in Geneva removed one more barrier.
At the final Situation Room meeting on February 26, no one could guarantee the consequences of war. Still, the room moved toward Trump’s instinct rather than a shared strategic consensus. The report says Trump closed the discussion by saying, “I think we have to do this.”
The final order was sent from Air Force One
According to the article, Trump gave the final authorization the following afternoon while aboard Air Force One. The directive approved “Operation Epic Fury” and said it was not to be halted. That order ended weeks of argument inside the administration, with intelligence doubts, military concerns, and political objections all overridden by the president’s decision.