Polkadot is weighing a broad rewrite of its staking rules through Referenda 1909 and 1910. The proposals would strengthen the role of validator self-stake at a minimum of 10,000 DOT, while reducing the nominator unbonding period from about 28 days to just 48 hours. If approved, the changes would alter how DOT holders earn rewards, manage liquidity, and take on staking risk.
Validator self-stake would take a larger share of incentives
Referendum 1909 builds on an already approved requirement that validators hold at least 10,000 DOT in self-stake. The new proposal adds extra rewards for validators who lock more of their own capital in the network. The aim is clear: increase economic accountability and tie validator incentives more closely to Polkadot’s security model.
Under the proposal, incentives for validator self-stake would receive 22.6% of the Dynamic Allocation Program budget, while 45.2% would go to staker rewards. Distribution would use a concave weighting model, a structure intended to stop larger validators from taking an outsized share of the reward pool. The decision would be made through OpenGov, Polkadot’s on-chain governance system, where DOT holders vote on technical and economic changes.
Nominator unbonding could drop from 28 days to 48 hours
Referendum 1910 focuses on the nominator side of the system. It would cut the unbonding period from roughly 28 days to 48 hours, a change that would sharply improve liquidity for staked DOT and give participants more flexibility in adjusting positions inside the network.
The same proposal would also remove slashing penalties for nominators. At present, nominators can lose funds if they back validators that misbehave. Removing that risk would make staking easier to access for individual participants and reduce one of the main frictions tied to delegation.
Zero commission proposal would reshape validator economics
Referendum 1909 also calls for validator commission rates to be reset to 0 and for the maximum commission cap to be updated. In that model, validators would benefit more directly from the DOT they stake themselves instead of collecting commission from nominators. That is a meaningful change in how validator income is structured.
Supporters argue this would align validator incentives more closely with overall network health. Critics say smaller validators could find it harder to stay competitive. Backers of the proposal point to the weighted reward model as a way to reduce that imbalance.
Lower-threshold validators could be chilled by the network
The proposals also introduce a non-permissioned chilling mechanism for validators that fall below the required self-stake threshold. The chill threshold would be lowered to 32%, allowing network participants to remove under-collateralized validators from the active set. This shifts more enforcement power toward the network itself.
Safeguards are included to keep the validator set from dropping below safe operating levels. As staking accessibility and validator economics draw more attention across blockchain networks, Polkadot is preparing a large-scale update to its staking and governance framework. If approved, the reforms would recast the network’s long-term staking model and lower barriers for a wider group of users.