Russia’s campaign to tighten control over the domestic internet has entered another confrontational phase, this time centered on VPN providers. Roskomnadzor, the country’s communications watchdog, has demanded that major VPN services connect to the Federal State Information System, or FSIS, a state-run registry used to enforce access restrictions to blacklisted websites. The goal is straightforward: ensure that VPN providers do not enable users to reach online resources that Russian authorities have banned.
But the response from the industry has been anything but compliant. According to the report, only Kaspersky Secure Connection agreed to cooperate, while multiple international VPN providers either declined outright, did not respond, or indicated they would not connect to the system even before receiving formal notice. Some companies also moved servers out of Russia, while Avast Secureline VPN announced it would withdraw from the country, arguing that compliance would conflict with its principles and the broader idea of internet freedom.
A Broad Push to Enforce Filtering
Roskomnadzor reportedly sent notices to 10 VPN services: Tor Guard, Vypr VPN, Open VPN, Nord VPN, VPN Unlimited, IP Vanish, Hide My Ass!, Hola VPN, Express VPN, and Kaspersky Secure Connection. Of these, seven refused to collaborate, two did not respond, and only one agreed. In addition, several other VPN services that were not directly contacted also signaled that they would not integrate with FSIS.
The regulator’s position is backed by amendments introduced in late 2017 to Russia’s federal law on information, information technologies, and information protection. Under those rules, VPN providers and anonymization services are expected to register with Roskomnadzor and connect to FSIS within 30 working days. Once connected, they are required to limit access to internet resources banned in the Russian Federation.
Roskomnadzor’s chief said that nine VPN platforms that failed to comply could be blocked within a month. The warning reflects a broader strategy by Russian authorities to make intermediaries responsible for implementing state censorship policy. Search engines have already been brought into that framework. Yandex, Sputnik, Mail.ru, and Rambler reportedly complied, while Google was fined 500,000 rubles, or around $8,000, for failing to meet similar requirements before later paying the penalty.
Resistance From Privacy Services
The standoff is especially notable because VPNs are widely used by privacy-conscious internet users, including members of the crypto community. For many users, VPNs are not simply a convenience tool but an important layer of digital security, particularly in environments where access restrictions, surveillance concerns, or platform blocking are common.
That helps explain why the industry’s response has been so firm. Avast Secureline VPN, for example, concluded that complying with Roskomnadzor’s demands would violate its own values and undermine the rights of users to a freer internet. Since it would no longer be able to offer meaningful service under those conditions, the company informed Russian customers that subscriptions would not be renewable going forward.
Other providers appear to be taking operational steps rather than making public political statements. The report says some firms have already moved servers outside the country, reducing their exposure to local enforcement and potentially preserving service continuity for users who can still access their apps and networks.
The Wider Battle Over the Runet
The dispute over VPN compliance is part of a much larger struggle over the future of the Russian internet, often referred to as the Runet. Roskomsvoboda, a Russian digital rights organization that opposes internet censorship, maintains a database showing that more than 173,000 websites, forums, messengers, media outlets, and other online platforms have been banned at one time or another in Russia. The blacklist has been shaped by decisions from a range of state institutions, including ministries, government agencies, and the prosecutor’s office.
Not every blocking decision has been permanent. Some services have later been removed from the blacklist, including the crypto exchange aggregator Bestchange.ru. Another example cited in the report is Hidemy.name, a VPN provider that was blocked after a court ruling in the Mari El Republic in 2017. With legal assistance from Roskomsvoboda, the platform successfully challenged that ruling in 2019, and Roskomnadzor subsequently lifted the block.
That case highlighted an important weakness in the state’s enforcement process. According to legal experts involved, courts did not sufficiently understand how VPN technologies work, and the defense was able to identify procedural violations. Even so, activists emphasized that the broader legal and regulatory conflict was far from over.
Technical Limits of Enforcement
Even if Russian regulators are determined to block non-compliant VPNs, execution may be more difficult than the legal rhetoric suggests. Critics argue that Roskomnadzor and domestic internet service providers are not fully prepared to block VPN services at the application and infrastructure level. Shutting down a website where users download an app is one thing; disrupting the app itself or severing its connection to external servers is far more complex.
The report notes that regulators may find it easy to target public-facing domains and web portals, but much harder to force platform operators like Apple and Google to remove applications from their stores, or to reliably identify and block encrypted VPN traffic across networks. That challenge becomes even more significant when dealing with providers that already have experience navigating highly restrictive markets such as China.
As one legal expert pointed out, many of the VPN services contacted by Roskomnadzor have already spent years adapting to China’s Great Firewall. That experience could make them more resilient in Russia as censorship systems become more sophisticated.
DPI, Automation, and the Sovereign Internet Agenda
Russian authorities are not standing still. Government agencies have been working to improve technical enforcement, including plans for an automated blocking system that would monitor whether search engines, VPNs, proxy servers, and anonymizers comply with federal law. The system was reportedly expected to become available by the end of 2019.
Officials and state-linked entities have also explored the use of DPI, or Deep Packet Inspection, to identify VPN traffic patterns more effectively. If deployed broadly across internet service providers, DPI could make censorship enforcement more targeted and potentially more disruptive. Still, such systems are expensive, operationally sensitive, and prone to overblocking, creating risks not only for privacy tools but for legitimate businesses that rely on stable internet access.
These measures are tied to the so-called sovereign internet framework, part of Russia’s “Digital Economy National Program.” Backers of the policy say it is designed to protect the Russian segment of the internet from external threats by creating a more self-contained and controllable network environment. Critics counter that the policy expands censorship powers, weakens internet freedom, and could damage businesses dependent on open connectivity, including crypto-related platforms.
The broader proposal includes routing Russian internet traffic through government-controlled points and granting Roskomnadzor sweeping authority over non-compliant internet providers. The cost of the system was estimated at more than 30 billion rubles, or nearly $500 million, raising questions not only about civil liberties but also about financial efficiency and technical viability.
Why This Matters for Crypto Users
For cryptocurrency users, the issue goes beyond politics. Crypto communities often depend on tools that preserve access, privacy, and censorship resistance. VPNs are commonly used to access exchanges, wallets, research platforms, and messaging channels, especially in jurisdictions where internet controls are unpredictable. Any effort to force VPN providers into a state filtering framework could weaken those protections and reduce the practical openness of the online environment in which crypto activity operates.
At the same time, the report suggests this confrontation is unlikely to be resolved quickly. Instead, it points to a prolonged cat-and-mouse dynamic in which regulators expand technical controls while providers and users adapt. Russia may increase pressure through blocking, app restrictions, automated monitoring, and traffic analysis, but VPN operators are likely to respond with infrastructure shifts, protocol changes, and new distribution methods.
For now, the immediate picture is clear: Moscow wants VPN services to become enforcement partners in its censorship architecture, and many providers are unwilling to accept that role. The result is a growing clash between state control and privacy infrastructure—one with implications for internet freedom, digital rights, and the operational realities of crypto users inside Russia.