Russia’s effort to build a more self-contained internet took a major step forward after the State Duma approved legislation designed to shield Runet from external threats and enable it to operate more independently from the global web. While the bill still requires further formal approval, the scale of support in parliament signals strong political backing for a deeper restructuring of the country’s internet infrastructure.
The proposed framework has drawn attention far beyond telecom policy. Supporters present it as a resilience measure that would help Russia keep its domestic internet functioning even if connections to foreign infrastructure were disrupted. Critics, however, see a very different picture: a more centralized system, higher operating costs, broader censorship powers, and a more difficult environment for digital businesses, including cryptocurrency platforms already facing legal uncertainty.
How the law would reshape Runet
At the center of the legislation is a plan to route Russian internet traffic through government-controlled exchange points and strengthen the role of Roskomnadzor, the country’s telecom watchdog. Under the proposal, the regulator would gain the authority to disconnect providers that do not comply with the new technical and regulatory requirements.
Roskomnadzor would also establish a monitoring center tasked with detecting threats and issuing instructions to network operators. Another key element is the creation and maintenance of a national domain name system, or DNS, designed to ensure that the Russian segment of the internet remains operational even if links to servers located abroad are interrupted.
The broader policy goal is to keep data transfers between Russian citizens, companies, and institutions inside the country whenever possible, rather than allowing traffic to be routed internationally. In practical terms, this would amount to a more nationally controlled internet architecture, one less dependent on external systems and international routing paths.
According to the report, the Runet law was expected to enter into force in November, while rules covering Russian domains and cryptographic protection of information were expected from January 1, 2021. The timeline underscored the seriousness of the initiative and suggested that lawmakers intended to move from legislative approval to operational implementation in stages.
Security rationale versus censorship concerns
Russian authorities have framed the project as a defensive move. The country has faced pressure and sanctions threats from Western governments over alleged cyber activity, and the sovereign internet concept is being presented as a way to guarantee continuity if foreign infrastructure or external internet links become unreliable or unavailable.
Yet opponents argue that the law’s stated purpose is too vague and that its technical design could expand state control far beyond emergency preparedness. One of the most outspoken critics cited in the report was Roskomsvoboda, an organization focused on internet freedom, anti-censorship advocacy, and online self-regulation. Its founder, Artem Kozlyuk, criticized the law as an ill-defined response to unspecified “external threats,” warning that it could make the network more centralized and therefore more fragile rather than more secure.
His argument was straightforward: decentralized systems are often more resilient to outside pressure, while overly centralized systems create chokepoints that can fail, be abused, or be attacked. From that perspective, moving traffic filtering, routing, domain management, and cryptographic oversight closer to direct state control introduces new technical and legal risks rather than removing them.
The legislation has also fueled fears that the infrastructure could be used for censorship. Some observers compared the proposal to China’s Great Firewall, and public protests were held against the initiative. The concern is not only that the government could monitor or slow traffic more effectively, but that it could more easily suppress access to unwanted platforms and services by consolidating control over the network’s most sensitive operational layers.
The cost burden could be substantial
Another major source of controversy is cost. Implementation of the law was estimated at more than 30 billion rubles, or nearly $500 million, according to the report. That figure alone made the legislation politically and economically significant.
But critics cited even larger ongoing expenses. Russia’s government working group on IT and communications reportedly estimated that maintaining a sovereign Runet could cost as much as 134 billion rubles per year, or more than $2 billion. Those numbers have raised questions about who will ultimately pay for the new architecture.
If the burden falls heavily on telecom operators, users may end up absorbing part of the cost through more expensive internet access. Kozlyuk warned that mandatory filtering equipment and traffic controls could also affect network quality, creating slower connections and more frequent technical failures. In addition, he suggested that a more tightly managed system could increase the risk of market concentration, potentially strengthening monopolistic tendencies in the internet services sector.
Regional outages and localized disconnections were also cited as possible side effects of a more interventionist and centrally managed network. In other words, the same mechanisms intended to increase resilience in one scenario could create new vulnerabilities in everyday operation.
Limits to full isolation
Even so, critics do not necessarily believe Russia can fully sever itself from the global internet in practice. Kozlyuk argued that the effectiveness of any large-scale blockade would depend in part on the willingness of internet providers to comply with censorship demands. If providers resist, he suggested, some online resources could remain accessible despite official restrictions.
He pointed to the example of VPN services that had reportedly refused to redirect traffic to Roskomnadzor, describing that stance as encouraging for those concerned about internet openness. His comments implied that infrastructure law alone may not determine the final degree of isolation; implementation, technical workarounds, and institutional resistance could all shape the real-world outcome.
Why crypto businesses are watching closely
The report highlighted that Russia’s crypto industry could be among the sectors most negatively affected by the new internet regime. That is partly because cryptocurrency businesses in the country were already operating in an uncertain regulatory environment. Lawmakers had repeatedly delayed a broader package of bills intended to regulate digital financial assets and related issues, leaving many firms in limbo.
According to Kozlyuk, cryptocurrencies were in a legal gray zone in Russia, and crypto-related portals were often subject to prosecution or blocking efforts. Although some of those restrictions had been successfully challenged in court, prosecutors reportedly continued to seek judicial orders against various platforms.
For businesses trying to serve Russian users, this creates a difficult operating environment even before the sovereign internet project is fully implemented. If internet access becomes more centralized and filtering tools become more powerful, the compliance risk for exchanges, wallet services, educational portals, and crypto media could rise further.
The broader effect may be strategic rather than merely technical. As Kozlyuk noted, Russian developers were increasingly looking to other markets where regulatory risks were lower and authorities were more constructive toward innovation. That trend could intensify if firms conclude that the combination of legal ambiguity and stricter network control makes long-term domestic growth less viable.
A turning point for Russia’s digital future
The Runet law is about more than internet routing. It represents a deeper debate over how digital sovereignty should be defined and who should control the infrastructure that underpins online communication, commerce, and innovation. Supporters see a defensive national system built to withstand geopolitical pressure. Opponents see a costly centralization project that could weaken openness, raise barriers for business, and extend state power over the flow of information.
For the crypto sector, the stakes are particularly clear. An industry already navigating uncertain regulation may now have to contend with a more restrictive network environment as well. Whether the sovereign internet model becomes a partial resilience tool or a broader mechanism of control, its implications for Russian internet users, technology firms, and crypto platforms could be lasting.