Russia’s campaign to tighten control over the domestic internet has entered another confrontational phase, this time focusing on VPN providers widely used by privacy-conscious users, including many in the crypto community. The country’s communications watchdog, Roskomnadzor, has pressed VPN services to connect to the Federal State Information System (FSIS), a registry containing websites and online resources blocked by Russian authorities. The goal is straightforward: ensure VPN operators do not provide access to content that Moscow has already banned.
According to the report, Roskomnadzor sent notices to 10 VPN providers, including Tor Guard, Vypr VPN, Open VPN, Nord VPN, VPN Unlimited, IP Vanish, Hide My Ass!, Hola VPN, Express VPN, and Kaspersky Secure Connection. The overwhelming response was resistance rather than compliance. Only Kaspersky agreed to cooperate, while several providers rejected the demand outright, some moved servers out of Russia, and others did not respond. In addition, another group of VPN services that had not even been formally notified reportedly said they also would not join the system.
Compliance Demands Backed by Threat of Blocking
The confrontation is rooted in amendments made in late 2017 to Russia’s federal law “On Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection.” Under those changes, VPN services and anonymizers are expected to register with Roskomnadzor and connect to the FSIS within 30 working days. Their key legal obligation is to restrict access to internet resources banned in the Russian Federation.
Roskomnadzor chief Alexander Zharov said that nine VPN platforms that had failed to meet the agency’s requirements could be blocked within a month. That warning signaled a possible shift from administrative pressure to direct enforcement. Sarkis Darbinyan, lead legal expert at internet freedom group Roskomsvoboda, said the regulator appeared to have compiled an additional list of VPN services and asked them to filter traffic as well.
The pressure extends beyond VPNs. Search engines are subject to similar obligations, and Russian internet companies such as Yandex, Sputnik, Mail.ru, and Rambler have already complied. Google, by contrast, was fined earlier for failing to meet the requirement. Roskomnadzor said the company paid a 500,000-ruble fine, roughly $8,000, and is now filtering search results in accordance with FSIS rules.
Some Providers Exit Instead of Cooperate
For a number of VPN companies, the issue is not only legal but also principled. Darbinyan said Avast Secureline VPN announced it would withdraw from Russia because complying with Roskomnadzor’s demands would violate both the company’s principles and the broader right to internet freedom. Since it could no longer provide meaningful service under those conditions, Avast informed users in Russia that subscriptions would not be renewed going forward.
This response underscores the larger tension between state-directed internet controls and the business models of privacy-focused providers. VPN services are often marketed on the basis of security, anonymity, and resistance to censorship. A requirement to integrate with a government blacklist system cuts directly against that promise, especially for users who rely on VPNs to preserve access to information or protect online activity from surveillance.
The Broader Battle Over the Russian Internet
The dispute over VPN regulation is part of a much larger struggle over the future of the Runet, the Russian segment of the internet. Roskomsvoboda maintains a database showing that more than 173,000 websites, forums, messengers, media outlets, and other online platforms have been banned at some point by Russian authorities. The blocking orders have come from a range of state institutions, including ministries, government agencies, and the Prosecutor’s Office.
Not every blocked resource stays offline permanently. The report notes that some services have later been removed from blacklists, including the crypto exchange aggregator Bestchange.ru. There have also been legal reversals. One notable example involved Hidemy.name, a VPN provider that was blocked in 2017 after a ruling by a regional court in Russia’s Mari El Republic. With legal assistance from Roskomsvoboda, the provider successfully challenged that ruling in May 2019, leading to the cancellation of the original decision and its subsequent unblocking by Roskomnadzor.
Darbinyan argued that Russian courts had not adequately examined how VPN technology actually works and said lawyers were able to identify numerous procedural violations in the case. For digital rights advocates, the reversal served as evidence that at least some blocking actions can still be contested successfully, even as the overall direction of regulation grows more restrictive.
Can Russia Technically Block VPNs at Scale?
While Roskomnadzor has legal tools and public authority, the technical challenge of effectively blocking VPNs is far more complex. Darbinyan said Russian regulators and internet service providers did not appear fully prepared to carry out comprehensive VPN blocking. He suggested that restricting access to websites where users download VPN apps would be relatively easy, but that preventing users from obtaining or using the applications themselves is much harder.
In particular, he noted that Roskomnadzor cannot simply force Apple and Google to remove mobile apps from their stores in a straightforward way. Even more difficult would be severing connectivity between user devices and VPN operators’ servers. That kind of network-level interference requires deeper technical capabilities, more aggressive filtering, and more consistent coordination across ISPs.
Those limits matter because Russia has already struggled in past censorship campaigns. The article points to the long and controversial effort to block Telegram, the messaging platform founded by Pavel Durov and popular in the crypto community. Roskomnadzor took nearly a year to move decisively against Telegram, while other messaging services such as Blackberry, Imo, and Line were banned much more quickly. Telegram’s case became emblematic of how politically determined blocking efforts can fail when they run up against resilient technology and adaptive users.
Automation, DPI, and the Future of Runet Enforcement
Russian authorities appear aware of these limitations and are trying to improve enforcement capacity. The Main Radio Frequency Center, which is subordinate to Roskomnadzor, reportedly requested development of an automated blocking system in March, with availability targeted for December 2019. The system is intended to monitor whether search engines, VPN services, proxy servers, and anonymizers are complying with Federal Law No. 276-FZ, the law affecting VPNs.
Darbinyan said that if Russia equips internet providers with learning-based DPI (Deep Packet Inspection) tools capable of recognizing VPN traffic patterns, the state may become more effective at enforcing restrictions. Even so, he described the confrontation as a prolonged cat-and-mouse game, not a decisive victory for either side.
He also noted that many of the VPN providers targeted by Roskomnadzor already have substantial experience operating under hostile conditions in markets such as China, where they have long had to adapt to the Great Firewall. That operational background may make it easier for them to adjust to Russian blocking measures and maintain some level of service despite mounting pressure.
Why This Matters to the Crypto Community
The issue resonates strongly with crypto users because VPNs are often essential tools for accessing global services, safeguarding privacy, and bypassing local restrictions. In environments where exchanges, news platforms, wallets, or forums can be blocked or throttled, VPNs become part of the basic digital infrastructure for participation in the broader crypto economy.
Russia’s internet control measures are being advanced under a wider policy framework often referred to as the Runet law or linked to the “Digital Economy National Program.” Adopted by the State Duma in April, the legislation is described by its sponsors as a way to protect the Russian internet from external threats and strengthen digital sovereignty. Critics, however, argue that it will reduce internet freedom, expand state power over routing and access, and create new burdens for businesses that depend on the open web, including crypto-related platforms.
As previously reported, some of the law’s provisions envision routing Russian internet traffic through government-controlled points and granting Roskomnadzor broader authority over network enforcement. The cost of the system has been estimated at more than 30 billion rubles, or nearly $500 million, raising concerns not only about censorship but also about spending, efficiency, and cybersecurity risk.
In practical terms, the conflict between Roskomnadzor and VPN providers is a test case for how far Russia can go in converting legal mandates into real technical control. For now, resistance remains significant, enforcement remains uneven, and providers appear unwilling to compromise on core privacy commitments. The result is an unstable but familiar dynamic: the state expands its censorship architecture, service providers adapt, users search for workarounds, and the contest continues.