Russia’s internet regulator is intensifying its campaign to bring virtual private network providers under tighter state control, but many of the companies targeted by the move are refusing to comply. The dispute centers on Roskomnadzor’s demand that VPN services connect to the Federal State Information System, or FSIS, a government-run registry that contains data on websites blocked by Russian authorities. By joining the system, providers would effectively be expected to prevent users from reaching banned online resources.
The issue matters well beyond the VPN industry itself. VPNs are widely used by privacy-focused internet users, journalists, and members of the crypto community seeking access to global platforms and unrestricted information. As Moscow expands its digital control architecture, the clash between regulators and privacy tools is becoming a broader test of how far the Russian state can reshape internet access without fully breaking the practical utility of the open web.
Major VPN brands resist compliance
According to the report, Roskomnadzor sent notices to Tor Guard, Vypr VPN, Open VPN, Nord VPN, VPN Unlimited, IP Vanish, Hide My Ass!, Hola VPN, Express VPN, and Kaspersky Secure Connection. The regulator wanted these companies to connect to FSIS and ensure their subscribers could not use the services to bypass Russian restrictions. The response from the industry was overwhelmingly negative.
Only Kaspersky agreed to cooperate. Several companies openly rejected the requirement, while some reportedly moved servers out of Russia. Others did not respond at all. In addition, a separate group of VPN services that had not formally received notices also indicated they would not connect to the system. Roskomnadzor later warned that nine VPN platforms could be blocked within a month for failing to comply with the law barring services that facilitate circumvention of official restrictions.
This resistance illustrates a fundamental conflict between the design of VPN products and the demands of state filtering. Many VPN operators market themselves on commitments to user privacy, open access, and security. Connecting to a state blacklist system would require them to actively participate in censorship enforcement, a position some providers view as incompatible with their core business and values.
Some providers choose to leave Russia
One of the clearest signs of that tension came from Avast Secureline VPN, which, according to the report, decided to withdraw from the Russian market. The company’s reasoning was straightforward: complying with Roskomnadzor’s requirements would violate its principles and undermine the freedom of the internet. Since it would no longer be able to provide meaningful value to Russian users under those conditions, Avast said subscriptions in the country would no longer be renewable.
This kind of market exit underscores the business costs of regulatory escalation. For some international platforms, staying in Russia may require changes so extensive that the local operation ceases to resemble the service offered elsewhere. In such cases, leaving the market can become the only way to avoid both legal risk and reputational damage.
The broader implication is that tighter internet controls do not only affect dissidents or politically sensitive content. They can also reduce consumer choice, fragment digital services by jurisdiction, and push global companies to reconsider whether local compliance remains feasible. For users, the result may be fewer reliable tools and a shrinking ability to access information on equal terms with the rest of the world.
The legal framework behind the crackdown
Roskomnadzor’s demands did not emerge in a vacuum. The report notes that amendments made in late 2017 to Russia’s federal law on information and information technologies require VPN providers and anonymizers to register with the regulator and connect to FSIS within 30 working days. A key obligation under that regime is to block access to internet resources banned in the Russian Federation.
Search engines are subject to similar rules. Russian internet companies including Yandex, Sputnik, Mail.ru, and Rambler had already complied. Google, by contrast, had earlier been sanctioned for failing to meet the same requirement. Roskomnadzor said the company later paid a 500,000-ruble fine, roughly $8,000, and began filtering searches in line with FSIS rules.
These examples show the regulator pursuing a layered strategy rather than focusing on one category of intermediaries. Search engines, VPNs, proxy tools, anonymizers, and internet service providers all form part of the access chain. The more actors the state can bring into compliance, the less room remains for users to route around blocks.
A long-running battle over the Russian internet
The struggle over VPNs is part of a much larger contest over the future of the Runet, the Russian segment of the internet. Roskomsvoboda, an NGO that campaigns against internet censorship, maintains a database showing that more than 173,000 websites, forums, messengers, news outlets, and other platforms have at some point been blocked by Russian authorities. Some restrictions were later reversed, but the overall scale of intervention is significant.
The report highlights a more encouraging case involving Hidemy.name, a VPN service blocked in 2017 by a regional court in the Mari El Republic. With legal support from Roskomsvoboda, the provider challenged the ruling, and the organization’s legal team succeeded in having the decision overturned. Roskomnadzor subsequently unblocked the service. According to Roskomsvoboda’s legal expert Sarkis Darbinyan, the original court had not examined VPN technology deeply enough, and lawyers identified multiple procedural violations.
That case suggests Russia’s censorship machinery is not legally invincible. Some blocking decisions can be contested, especially where courts or regulators have acted with insufficient technical understanding or procedural rigor. Still, isolated legal victories do not necessarily reverse the overall direction of policy, which continues to favor centralized control.
Can Russia really block VPNs effectively?
Darbinyan argued that Roskomnadzor and Russian ISPs may not yet be technically prepared to block VPNs in a fully effective way. In his view, the easiest move is to block websites where users download VPN applications. A much harder challenge is forcing Apple and Google to remove apps from their stores, or breaking the underlying connectivity between applications and provider servers.
That distinction is crucial. Blocking a website may create friction, but it does not automatically eliminate access for users who already have apps installed, know alternative distribution channels, or can connect directly to remote servers. Comprehensive enforcement would likely require much more advanced traffic identification and filtering capabilities.
The report links this problem to Russia’s earlier attempt to block Telegram, the messaging app founded by Pavel Durov. That campaign became emblematic of the limits of blunt-force internet blocking, as authorities struggled to restrict access without causing collateral disruption. Darbinyan suggested a similar gap could emerge again with VPNs, especially given that many providers have already spent years adapting to hostile censorship environments elsewhere.
He specifically pointed to the experience of major VPN services operating in China and navigating the Great Firewall. Providers familiar with that environment may be able to adjust to Russian conditions with relative speed, reinforcing the idea that the confrontation is likely to become a prolonged technical arms race rather than a quick regulatory victory.
Automation, DPI, and the next phase of enforcement
Even so, the Russian state appears determined to improve its technical toolkit. According to the report, the Main Radio Frequency Center, which is subordinate to Roskomnadzor, requested development in March of an automated blocking system. The planned system was intended to monitor whether search engines, VPN services, proxy servers, and anonymizers comply with the federal law affecting VPNs, with availability targeted for December 2019.
The report also mentions the possible deployment of DPI, or Deep Packet Inspection, tools to internet service providers. DPI can help identify traffic patterns and classify different types of connections, making it a potentially powerful mechanism for detecting VPN usage. If deployed broadly and effectively, such systems could improve the regulator’s ability to distinguish circumvention traffic from ordinary internet activity.
Still, DPI is not a magic solution. Its effectiveness depends on infrastructure, scale, implementation quality, and the ability of providers to continuously adapt. Obfuscation techniques, protocol changes, and distributed server architecture can complicate enforcement. That is why observers described the situation as a continuing cat-and-mouse game rather than a settled policy outcome.
Implications for crypto and digital businesses
The report frames the VPN conflict as part of the wider package of measures associated with Russia’s so-called Runet law, linked to the country’s digital economy agenda and adopted by the State Duma in April 2019. Supporters said the goal was to shield the Russian internet from external threats and make it more sovereign. Critics, however, argued that the approach would curtail internet freedom and harm businesses that rely on open connectivity.
That concern extends directly to crypto-related activity. Exchanges, wallet services, aggregators, communities, and educational platforms often depend on cross-border access, uncensored communication channels, and infrastructure that does not map neatly onto national boundaries. If the state gains wider power to reroute traffic through government-controlled points and pressure intermediaries into filtering content, crypto platforms may face additional compliance burdens, intermittent accessibility issues, or outright blocking risk.
The report notes that the planned system for sovereign internet control could cost more than 30 billion rubles, close to $500 million, from the state budget. Beyond financial cost, the deeper issue is strategic: whether the Russian internet can remain interoperable with the global web while increasingly subordinated to centralized filtering and routing control.
For now, the standoff over VPNs captures the central dilemma. The state is pushing to make access control more enforceable, while providers and digital rights advocates argue that privacy tools should not be converted into censorship instruments. As long as both sides keep upgrading their tactics, Russia’s internet governance battle is likely to remain unresolved — and highly consequential for users, privacy services, and the broader crypto ecosystem.