Zcash’s Zakura node software team has disclosed a post-quantum security upgrade centered on cross-chain swaps, according to CoinDesk. The proposal would generate a separate viewing key for each ZEC asset exchange carried out through NEAR Intents, while the corresponding spending key would remain inside the user’s main account system.
The goal is to close a privacy gap created by cross-chain activity that leaves traces on public blockchains and to reduce the chance that a future practical quantum computer could reconstruct a user’s full financial history.
Why refund addresses create a long-term privacy issue
NEAR Intents lets users match and execute exchanges across different blockchains. In the example described in the report, when a trader tries to convert ZEC from a privacy pool into USDC, the protocol publishes a Zcash shielded address on the NEAR blockchain as a refund route in case the cross-chain match fails.
Even if the swap completes successfully and no refund is ever used, that address still remains permanently on NEAR’s public ledger as transaction metadata.
The threat model looks ahead to quantum attacks on public-key cryptography
Under classical von Neumann computing, publishing such an address does not by itself reveal the holder’s private information. The report says each Zcash private address is built on elliptic-curve discrete logarithm assumptions, with one-way mathematical hardness protecting both the viewing key and the spending private key.
The concern is that large-scale commercial quantum computers, if they become practical, could run Shor’s algorithm and derive the private parameters underlying public keys in polynomial time.
The deeper problem comes from Zcash’s key derivation model. A standard Zcash wallet can derive many distinct-looking addresses, but those addresses often share the same master viewing key underneath. If a refund address posted on a public chain were someday reversed by quantum computing, an attacker could use the recovered viewing key to inspect all historical incoming payments to that account, the real transaction amounts, and any encrypted memo data attached to them.
That would turn a single exposed address into a much broader privacy failure.
One key per swap is meant to contain the blast radius
To reduce that long-tail leakage risk, the Zakura team is separating viewing authority from spending authority in the system design.
Under the new model, each cross-chain swap would receive its own independently generated viewing key with a one-time lifecycle. The main account’s spending key would stay protected in cold storage. Even if a quantum computer decades from now managed to break a refund address preserved in NEAR’s historical blocks, the attacker would only gain access to the records tied to that single exchange.
The user’s main wallet address, prior transfer history, and later on-chain activity would not be linkable through that one compromised point, based on the design described in the report.
In practical terms, the team is trying to keep any future cryptographic failure inside an isolated micro-session rather than letting one leak expose a full account-level asset profile.
PIR is intended to solve the wallet sync problem
That isolation comes with an engineering tradeoff. If an active trader completes hundreds of cross-chain interactions, the wallet could accumulate hundreds of separate keys. During wallet recovery from a seed phrase or synchronization across devices, the client would need to carry all of them and scan Zcash’s full block history one by one, creating heavy bandwidth costs and long sync delays.
To address that, the Zakura team said it has integrated Private Information Retrieval, or PIR, into the synchronization protocol. A wallet can send an encrypted query to a remote indexing node and directly locate the block where its refund funds arrived.
Under the PIR scheme, the remote database operator can answer the request without learning, in mathematical terms, which exact address or data pattern the wallet is querying.
Rollout timeline
The report notes that quantum attacks against public-key cryptography are still at the stage of theoretical validation and laboratory prototypes. The Zakura team said wallets built on its open-source library will begin rolling out the independent key mechanism over the coming weeks. Hardware wallet firmware support is set to follow, with full delivery planned before the industry’s post-quantum defense roadmap milestone.


