A Bitcoin Improvement Proposal for the post-quantum signature scheme SHRINCS has been published, putting a concrete Bitcoin-focused option into the debate over how the network could defend itself against future quantum attacks. The proposal comes from research led by Blockstream, whose team has already tested SHRINCS in production on the Liquid sidechain. Blockstream Research’s Jonas Nick described it as the first concrete post-quantum signature proposal designed specifically for Bitcoin, while also stressing that it is not meant to be Bitcoin’s final signature system and is not optimal in every respect. The core appeal is size. Existing post-quantum schemes endorsed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology are far larger than Bitcoin’s current ECDSA and Schnorr signatures, creating a major throughput problem if deployed directly on-chain. SHRINCS is still much bigger than Schnorr, but materially smaller than many alternatives, and Blockstream’s estimates suggest Bitcoin could still run at roughly 3 transactions per second under SHRINCS, versus 0.5 TPS for ML-DSA and 0.36 TPS for SPHINCS+. The catch is that SHRINCS is still early. Its BIP says the security proof remains unfinished, and the design introduces statefulness, signature growth over time, and a large fallback recovery path if a signing device is lost. Blockstream is also exploring lattice-based signatures and zero-knowledge proof aggregation, which it estimates could lift Bitcoin throughput to 6.7 TPS if combined with SHRINCS.

Bitcoin’s quantum-resistance research is advancing through new proposals including SHRIMPS for multi-device signatures, QSB for quantum-safe transactions without a soft fork, and a zk-STARK wallet recovery prototype that avoids exposing mnemonic phrases.

New quantum computing research has accelerated Bitcoin’s post-quantum security debate. Lower estimates for breaking ECDSA pushed proposals like BIP-361, BIP-360, and Blockstream’s SHRIMPS into focus, raising questions about migration timing, governance, and long-term network security.

Quantum computing studies drastically lower the qubit requirements to break Bitcoin's ECDSA, leading to urgent proposals like BIP-361 and industry moves within three weeks. Ethereum holds edge in post-quantum race with systematic preparation.

Two recent papers drastically lower the quantum hardware needed to break Bitcoin's encryption, sparking urgent debate. BIP-361 proposes phasing out old signatures in five years, affecting ~1.7M BTC. Ethereum already has a dedicated team.

New quantum computing research has intensified Bitcoin’s post-quantum security debate. BIP-361 proposes a phased migration path that could affect about 1.7 million BTC, raising sharp disagreements over security, governance, and upgrade costs.

This article debunks the claim that Lightning Network is 'helplessly broken' due to quantum computing. It details the actual attack window, reality of quantum hardware, and Bitcoin's post-quantum cryptography progress, concluding that the threat is limited and developers are actively working on solutions.

Responding to claims that Lightning Network is 'helplessly broken' by quantum computers, this article clarifies the real attack window is narrow, quantum hardware is far from ready, and developers have already produced multiple post-quantum proposals. Businesses should focus on progress, not panic.