How EIP-7702 Became a Key Link in the Binance Hot-Wallet Attack

How EIP-7702 Became a Key Link in the Binance Hot-Wallet Attack

N
News Editor
2026-11-08 00:22:39
On Oct. 29, 2026, hackers stole at least $6.3 billion from multiple Binance hot wallets across Ethereum, Arbitrum, Avalanche, Optimism, Bitcoin and Tron, according to public on-chain statistics. The central target was Binance 14, an Ethereum wallet that lost about $2.5 billion in a single sweep. Minutes earlier, the attackers had used a leaked private-key copy to sign an EIP-7702 authorization, delegating the wallet to a malicious sweeping contract. A valid nonce among 50 prepared authorizations gave the attackers ongoing code-level control. The delegation later allowed them to drain more than $200 million in assets deposited after the first sweep, without obtaining another signature from Binance 14. Ten other hot wallets across four chains subsequently sent funds to the same collection address through ordinary transactions signed by their own private keys. Tether and Circle froze about $1.8 billion in the attacker’s core receiving address, while ETH, AVAX, OP and ARB remained under the attackers’ control. The incident shows how EIP-7702 can turn a stolen key from a short-lived withdrawal tool into persistent control over an address.

A multichain theft centered on Binance 14

Hackers stole at least $6.3 billion from multiple Binance hot wallets on Oct. 29, 2026, according to public on-chain statistics. The wallets were spread across Ethereum, Arbitrum, Avalanche, Optimism, Bitcoin and Tron. If the public figures are confirmed, the incident would become the largest theft by value in crypto history.

The central target was Binance 14, an Ethereum address at 0x28C6c06298d514Db089934071355E5743bf21d60. The wallet was one of Binance’s largest and most active Ethereum hot wallets. At 20:24 UTC, the attacker drained roughly $2.5 billion from it in a single transaction.

Minutes before that sweep, the attacker used a copy of the wallet’s leaked private key to sign an EIP-7702 authorization. The authorization delegated Binance 14 to a malicious sweeping contract deployed in advance. Within 12 minutes of the first drain, 10 other Binance hot wallets on four chains sent funds to the same collection address. The attacker then used Binance 14, which remained under the delegation, to drain assets from a Binance smart-contract custody account.

Blockaid detected the sweep within two minutes

Blockaid’s security detection system raised an alert less than two minutes after the assets were swept, before the incident appeared in public media or social networks. Its automated analysis engine confirmed the private-key compromise and the EIP-7702 delegation mechanism within 11 minutes.

Stablecoin issuers Tether and Circle then froze about $1.8 billion in the attacker’s core receiving address. Tether CEO Paolo Ardoino later said that Tether had frozen more than $1.5 billion in USDT. Native assets, including ETH, AVAX, OP and ARB, could not be frozen by a centralized issuer and remained under the attacker’s control.

The Blockaid post-mortem covers the preparation phase, the EIP-7702 delegation and asset sweep, concurrent private-key signatures across four chains, the laundering route, asset freezes and the emergency response. It is aimed at exchanges, custodians and financial institutions that hold and manage large volumes of signing keys. Its central defenses are controls applied before a signature is produced and continuous on-chain monitoring while funds are moving.

Why EIP-7702 matters for hot wallets

Exchange hot wallets are online accounts used to process customer withdrawals and move funds between an exchange’s own wallets. They hold large amounts of operating liquidity and sign transactions continuously, often handling thousands of transfers each day.

The private key is the main control barrier between those balances and anyone holding a copy of the key. On Ethereum and other EVM-compatible networks, such wallets have historically been externally owned accounts, or EOAs. An EOA contains no contract code. Once the chain verifies a valid signature, funds move without an additional business-logic check at the blockchain layer.

EIP-7702 allows an ordinary EOA to execute smart-contract code. The account signs an authorization naming a contract address. Once that authorization is included in a Type-4 transaction, later calls involving the account execute the delegated contract logic, giving that logic full control over the account’s assets.

The authorization is tied to the account’s transaction counter, or nonce. The delegation remains active unless the account signs and broadcasts a new authorization that replaces or clears it.

For individual users, the mechanism can support transaction batching and sponsored gas payments. For an exchange hot wallet, the exposure is more severe. A single valid signature at the correct nonce can give an attacker long-term, code-level control over the address, including assets deposited there later.

Blockaid identified and confirmed four EIP-7702 security incidents during the first half of 2026, with combined losses of about $1.08 million. Each incident abused a different feature of the delegation mechanism. In its H1 2026 On-Chain Security Report, Blockaid warned that the first seven-figure, or million-dollar, loss would appear before the end of the year. The Binance incident matched that warning, with a reported amount three orders of magnitude larger than the prediction.

A direct-transfer attack is more conventional. An attacker uses a stolen key to sign ordinary transfer transactions. In a hot wallet that processes thousands of withdrawals, an individual transfer can look routine. The anomaly becomes easier to identify only when the recipient, amount and timing are reviewed together.

Both attack routes begin with a stolen private key. Detection therefore cannot rely only on known malicious signatures or contract-vulnerability indicators. It must also identify changes in behavior.

Preparation: test funds and a sweeping contract

The attacker’s operator address was 0x7C8601d4645b93cea45F71e118A729332e6B5CA0. Starting on Oct. 28, it received initial test funds through three withdrawals from Tornado Cash.

On Oct. 29, the operator ran the full authorization, delegation and sweep process on three test wallets under its control. Each test moved between $2 and $6. At 15:59 that day, the attacker deployed the sweeping contract later used against Binance. The contract address was 0x63e842B054Bd624a465454D533C33F573e9c6fAe, and its deployment transaction hash was 0x97408e….

The contract had not been open-source verified. It set the attacker’s operator address as its only authorized caller. Its Sweep function could move every token in a listed set, along with the account’s native ETH, to a specified receiving address in one operation. The contract also included a forwarding function that allowed a delegated account to call other external contracts.

Fifty authorizations and one matching nonce

At 20:20:59 UTC, the attacker’s operator sent a Type-4 transaction to Binance 14. The transaction hash was 0xad9926….

It carried 50 EIP-7702 authorization messages pre-signed with the Binance 14 private key. They covered the consecutive nonce range from 18,914,775 to 18,914,824, and each delegated the wallet to the attacker’s sweeping contract.

Binance 14 was still processing withdrawals across the network, so the attacker could not know the wallet’s exact live nonce at the moment of execution. The operator therefore signed a window of nonce values in bulk.

Forty-nine of the 50 authorizations failed because their nonces did not match. One matched precisely and took effect. While Binance’s routine withdrawal transactions continued to leave the wallet, the malicious delegation had already taken control of the address.

A single transaction drained about $2.5 billion

Three minutes and 24 seconds after the delegation became active, at 20:24:23, the attacker’s operator triggered the sweep on Binance 14. The transaction hash was 0x53bd38….

The transaction moved 167,464 ETH, 1.615 billion USDT and roughly 60 other tokens to the attacker’s collection address, 0x5227f603C1eE34CE3C06eFe6477003BDfCCB2f8c. The receiving address had no previous transaction history. After the sweep, Binance 14, which had held assets worth several billion dollars, retained only one ETH. Based on market prices at the time, the asset package was worth about $2.5 billion.

Other hot wallets moved funds across four chains

Only 24 seconds after the first sweep, Binance 16, at 0xDFd529…, sent funds to the same collection address. The transaction hash was 0x51f263…. It transferred 28,005.6 ETH, 55.7 million USDT, 25.9 million RLUSD, 84.5 WBTC and five other tokens.

During the following 12 minutes, Binance 55 on Optimism transferred 44.2 million OP. Four Binance hot wallets on Arbitrum transferred 74.6 million ARB and 8,426 ETH. Four other hot wallets on Avalanche transferred 1.81 million AVAX and 8.41 million USDT.

These wallets did not carry smart-contract code. Each transfer was a conventional transaction signed directly by the wallet’s own private key. The transfers were mixed into the normal flow of customer withdrawals.

The delegation kept draining later deposits

At 20:41:23, the attacker used Binance 14, which was still under delegated control, to call Binance’s Circle smart-custody account known as Binance Hot Wallet 34. The address was 0xEe7aE8….

The attacker moved 780 million USDC from that smart account to the collection address. The transaction hash was 0xdc102d…. Another 43 million USDC was transferred afterward.

At 21:44, the attacker ran a second sweep on Binance 14. The transaction hash was 0x55ba4d…. It removed 200 million USDT and 13 other tokens that external users had deposited after the first sweep.

As of 22:00 that day, the malicious delegation was still present on-chain. Any new assets sent to Binance 14 before the delegation was cleared could be swept without the attacker obtaining another signature from the wallet.

From a stolen key to persistent control

Before EIP-7702, a stolen hot-wallet key generally created a race. The attacker had to sign transfer after transfer as quickly as possible. Once the exchange detected the compromise, its operations team could still try to move remaining funds by offering higher gas fees. If the exchange rotated its operations to a new address, the stolen key for the old wallet would lose its practical value.

EIP-7702 changes that balance. One valid authorization at the right nonce can turn Binance 14 into a withdrawal program controlled by the attacker. The first sweep removed the existing balance at 20:24, but the delegation remained attached to the address. At 21:44, the attacker drained more than $200 million in later deposits without requesting a new signature from Binance 14.

Rotating the exchange’s internal business key would not by itself remove a delegation bound to the original address. The leaked private key would have to sign a new authorization that explicitly resets the delegated target to the zero address. Until that happens, assets entering Binance 14 remain available to the delegated code.

Teams managing large EOA accounts should treat EIP-7702 authorizations as privileged operations and apply controls as strict as those used for cold-wallet withdrawals. Code-state changes on every hot-wallet address should be monitored around the clock, and pre-signed revocation transactions should be prepared in advance. No inventory should remain at an address until its delegation state is confirmed safe. After a key compromise, the delegation should be cleared on-chain before keys are rotated and replacement wallets are funded.

Any delegation transaction should also pass its complete authorization list to the transaction review layer. If that list is removed, a dangerous delegation transaction can look like an otherwise harmless blank call to a trusted address.

What the incident shows

Private-key compromise remains one of the largest sources of financial loss in public-chain systems. If the public figures are confirmed, this incident will be the biggest theft in crypto history by value, exceeding the roughly $1.5 billion stolen from Bybit in February 2025 by more than three times.

Private keys from 11 Binance hot wallets signed transfers to a hacker address created only minutes earlier. One key wallet also signed an EIP-7702 authorization, turning itself into a long-lived tool for draining assets.

Compliant stablecoin issuers froze about $2.4 billion in assets within two hours of the incident, while the attacker still retained a large amount of ETH and other native assets. At the blockchain level, a valid signature made with a stolen key looks no different from one made with legitimate approval. The dividing line is the policy review applied when the signature is produced and the quality of on-chain monitoring during the first minutes of a fund movement.

This article was originally published by Bit.Fan. For more cryptocurrency news and market insights, visit www.bit.fan.
4500

Disclaimer:

The market information, project data, and third-party content displayed on this platform are for industry information sharing only and do not constitute any form of investment advice or return commitment.

Cryptocurrency trading carries high risks. Users should fully assess their risk tolerance and make independent decisions. All profits, losses, and legal responsibilities are borne by the users themselves.