KelpDAO has publicly blamed LayerZero infrastructure for an exploit tied to roughly $300 million, pushing back against LayerZero’s postmortem and turning the incident into a dispute over architecture, defaults, and operator responsibility.
The reported attack took place on April 18, 2026. KelpDAO said attackers used compromised systems connected to LayerZero’s DVN verification process to trigger fraudulent transactions across multiple DeFi protocols. After detecting the activity, the team paused contracts and said it blocked two additional forged transactions worth more than $100 million.
Focus shifts from smart contracts to offchain verification systems
KelpDAO and independent researchers said the breach did not come from a smart contract bug. Their account centers on offchain infrastructure, especially RPC nodes tied to the DVN layer. Chainalysis reported that the attackers relied on manipulated data rather than contract flaws, allowing a 1 of 1 DVN setup to approve invalid transactions.
LayerZero described the event differently. In its own report, the company said the incident resulted from KelpDAO’s configuration choices and characterized the attack as a targeted infrastructure breach that led to an RPC-spoofing event after node-level compromise. It also said the DVN instances themselves were not fully compromised.
KelpDAO rejects the configuration-only explanation
KelpDAO argued that the 1-1 DVN structure was not an unusual deployment. The team cited public data showing that thousands of OApp contracts used similar verification arrangements. It also said about 90% of LayerZero messages depended on one or two DVNs.
According to KelpDAO, LayerZero’s documentation directed developers toward default setups that used LayerZero Labs as the required DVN, without optional redundancy. Independent researchers added that some default deployments lacked multi-provider consensus controls, concentrating trust within a narrower infrastructure boundary.
Stolen rsETH spilled into lending markets
Researchers linked about 116,500 rsETH in losses to the exploit activity. KelpDAO also said the attackers gained access to RPC endpoint lists and compromised internal nodes operating across separate clusters inside LayerZero’s verification system.
The impact spread beyond the bridge layer. Stolen rsETH later moved into lending protocols, where downstream platforms absorbed collateralized assets connected to the exploit. Several markets tied to rsETH and related assets were paused during the period of liquidity stress. The dispute over blame remains unresolved, but the incident has put default DVN design, RPC security, and offchain trust assumptions under direct scrutiny.


