GebProxyActions Lacks Caller Access Control, About 5.9436 ETH Lost

GebProxyActions Lacks Caller Access Control, About 5.9436 ETH Lost

N
News Editor
2026-09-02 03:12:52
ChainCatcher reports, citing SlowMist monitoring, that the GebProxyActions contract has lost about 5.9436 ETH because it lacks caller access control. The loss is tied to how the affected user interacted with the contract. Instead of making a delegated call through DSProxy, the user invoked GebProxyActions.quitSystem directly. That left ownsSAFE[safe] assigned to the GebProxyActions contract itself rather than to a user-controlled proxy. An attacker then called GebProxyActions.quitSystem(manager, safe, dst) directly. In doing so, the attack bypassed the safeAllowed check that GebSafeManager normally enforces on such operations, and the collateral was transferred to the attacker's own address. SlowMist's monitoring flagged the incident, and ChainCatcher relayed the details. The direct call path also meant the quit operation skipped the proxy layer entirely; passing manager, safe, and dst was enough to complete the transfer. The exact identity of the affected user and any impact beyond the roughly 5.9436 ETH loss were not disclosed in the original update.

Incident overview

ChainCatcher says SlowMist monitoring identified a loss of about 5.9436 ETH from the GebProxyActions contract. The reason: the contract has no caller access control.

Root cause: a direct call instead of DSProxy

The failure started with the affected user's call pattern. They called GebProxyActions.quitSystem straight from the user address. They did not send it through DSProxy as a delegated call. That caused ownsSAFE[safe] to point to the GebProxyActions contract itself.

How the attacker drained the collateral

Once that ownership record pointed to the contract, the attacker could call GebProxyActions.quitSystem(manager, safe, dst) directly. No normal authorization layer stood in the way. The call skipped the safeAllowed check inside GebSafeManager, and the collateral ended up at the attacker's address. ChainCatcher's update, which relied on SlowMist monitoring, gave no further information about the victim or any other affected assets.

This article was originally published by Bit.Fan. For more cryptocurrency news and market insights, visit www.bit.fan.
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